Abstract -Collaboration systems require an appropriate uurhorizarion model to specifL and winrain policies that iiut only facilitate group activities but also enforce restrictions and uccountubility. Existing models fail to incorporate adequately into authorization decisions the rich notion of context rhut is inherent to any collaborative setting. In this paper we present the Locale-based Access Control (Locale-BA C) model for collaborative systems, a model whose design is based upon the.,application of Fitzparrick's Locule Framework for collabohion to the problem of access control. This model encapsulates the notion of context using locules, allowing for a nutural representation of collaborative authorization decisions.
Introduction
Collaborative systems have long recognized the usefulness of role-based specification of collaborative activities. The use of roles within collaborative systems, however, often is not driven by security requirements, hut rather by the complexities of collaborative activity specification and 'maintenance -i.e., many collaborative activities evolve more slowly than user participation in those activities. In fact, during the research and design process, collaborative systems traditionally pay little attention to security issues. This is further complicated by the fact that often the goals of collaborative system and security are competing. Collaborative systems emphasize the building of connections among people, tools, and applications; while security emphasizes the building and enforcing of boundaries in order to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
In [191, we survey existing solutions for collaborative access control. From preliminary work in access matrix and role-based models to recently proposed frameworks, traditional access control models have been extended using a variety of concepts. One of the most significant characteristics of these efforts is an emerging recognition of the importance of utilizing contextual information in authorization decisions. Context is one of the most defining attributes of collaborative environments because it encapsulates not only all types of environment variables (participants, resources, tasks, etc.) but also the dynamism and unpredictability associated with them. This, as well as the fact that context also embodies parameters such as time, place, presence, awareness, etc., is leading designers to incorporate broader notions of context into access control models for collaborative systems.
While the concept of role-based access control is well accepted, context introduces another level of consideration because a user in different roles could be active in different contexts and these contexts could change with hisher location, presence of other users in the same location or remote location, the roles in which other users are present and active, etc. Such a view finds strong support within social science communities. For example, S u c h " argues that one cannot effectively separate actions from the context in which they are performed without losing the meaning or implications of those actions [16].
Covington et. al. [3] introduce the notion of environment roles in order to provide for security in context-aware applications. These roles are activated based on environment conditions at the t i m e of request.
Such roles have been shown useful in ubiquitous computing where environment sensitive information is pervasive. However, it is insufficient to state that a user can perform an operation only if she is active in a particular role. Rather, a richer notion of context is needed. For instance, it may be the case that the user can perform the operation only if hisher current context includes (or possibly does not include) certain people, tools, resources, etc. For example, a professor might be able to readhew a grade sheet within a shared collaboration space as long as no sNdents are simultaneously present in that same space.
To facilitate authorization decisions based on a richer notion of context required by collaborative systems, we propose a new access control model called Locale Based Access Control (Locale-BAC). This model is grounded in Fitzpatrick's Locale Framework [5] , a multifaceted collaboration framework that, among other things, provides insight to the system designer in regards to the multi-dimensional nature of collaboration. We believe the Locale Framework offers a rich basis for describing collaboration context and, consequently, it guides our efforts to develop a more effective authorization model for collaborative systems.
Thus, in this paper we introduce the notion of a locale as a means of extending and relating sessions in RBAC I121 to provide a richer representation of context for authorization decisions. In addition, we present the formal definition of Locale-BAC and demonstrate its usefulness by newly identified constraints that are naturally expressible within Locale-BAC and required by many collaborative environments. Examples of such constraints include the principle of all privileged and the principle of grearesr authoriiy. We conclude with example scenarios that demonstrate the basics of Locale-BAC as well as these newly identified constraints.
Related Work
In this section, we provide a brief overview of existing approaches to access control for collaborative systems. A significant characteristic of several of these approaches is an emerging recognition of the importance of utilizing contextual information in authorization decisions.
By far the most prevalent approach to collaborative access control is models based on Access Matrices, e.g., [41, [IO] , [81, and [14] . Motivated by simplicity, access matrices provide an elegant model for associating subjects to permissions. At the same time, access matrices unfortunately incorporate very limited notions of context into authorization decisions. As a result, these models artificially restrict the utilization of context with collaborative systems. That is, the defmition of context within a collaborative system is bounded by the limitations of access matrices. [17] extends the notion of subject to groups of users, i.e., teams. Context-based TMAC (C-TMAC) [7] goes a step farther by introducing a context object that is associated with teams of users. This context object contains information such as time and place that are relevant to team definition. Covington et. al. [3] extend RBAC with the notion of environment roles in order to provide a broader notion of context within context-aware applications.
Other, more unique efforts to define access control for collaborative systems include Task-Based Access Control (TBAC) [18] and SPACE Access Control [2] . Access control within TBAC is granted in steps that are related to the progression of tasks. The SPACE model utilizes the notions of boundaries and access graphs to capture access capabilities among related collaborative environments.
While many of these efforts recognize the importance of context for authorization decisions, each fails to capture the multi-dimensional nature of context as expressed by the Locale Framework -TBAC focuses on process, TMAC and C-TMAC focus on groups, SPACE and Covington focus on organizational context. In the following section, we overview the Locale Framework as we believe it provides a rich, multi-dimensional view of the inherent role of context within collaborative activities, and therefore, collaborative access control.
Locale Framework
To facilitate authorization decisions based on a rich notion of context required by collaborative systems, we The purpose of the Locale Framework is multifacetted. Fmt, a locale provides a window by which to view, and therefore better understand, the interaction needs of groups of users committed to collection action (c.f., Straus' social worlds 1151). Second, a locale provides basis for characterizing the site and means utilized for collective action. As such, the framework serves as a bridge between communities and their environments providing a pathway for characterizing and understanding the mutual influence of community and environment (see Figure 1 ). This understanding impacts not only how we understand collective action but also informs the design of site and means for collective action. It is from this perspective that we ground our efforts to develop a more effective authorization model for access control. In the following, we briefly outline the principles of the Locale Framework. Collectively, these dimensions offer a rich basis for describing collaboration context and thus guide our efforts to develop a more effective authorization model for collaborative systems.
Social

Locale-Based Access Control Model
Locale-based Access Control (Locale-BAC) is acollaborative access control model grounded in Fitzpatrick's Locale Framework and derived from wellknown role-based access control (RBAC) model. To derive Locale-BAC, fundamental changes were made to RBAG, the baseline reference model to the well known family of RBAC reference models proposed by Sandu et. al. 1121 Changes were made to RBAG to account for the access control requirements unique to collaborative systems. Despite these derivations, however, Locale-BAC supports the complete RBACl reference model [ U ] , which is the most expressive model in the Sandu et. al. family of RBAC reference models. Key differences between Locale-BAC and RBAG exist in the definition of sessions and the introduction of locales. A locale is a group place 161, which has meaning only in relationship to the group of sessions that use it. A locale is used as a means of relating the sessions in context to support interactions among the users. Access control is supported by membership functions on the locale that grant or deny access to resources depending on system-defined membership levels. The definition of locale greatly simplifies the specification of access control constraints required by most collaboration environments. Locale: A locale is a long-lived, multi-session, collaborative environment. The session mapping of one user to possible many roles according to role-to-user assignment UA is restricted by the role-to-locale assignment RA.
Sessions:
A user establishes a session in context of each locale in which s h e wants to be active. While establishing a session, a user may activate a subset of the roles she is assigned as restricted by the roles assigned to the locale. In order to be active in a locale, a user must be able to create a non-empty session in the locale. Each session maps one user to possibly many roles, but a single locale. For a given session, multiple roles may be activated as restricted by the role-to-locale and user-torole assignment relations. The set of permissions available to a user in a locale is defined as the union of permissions from all roles activated in that user's locale session. While it also may be useful for a user to be able to assume multiple identities (i.e., sessions) in a single locale, we suggest constraining users such thas for a given locale, a user has at most one session (see Section 5).
Definition
The formal definition of the Locale-BAC model as shown in Figure 2 has the following components U, R, P, S, L (users, roles, permissions, sessions and locales, respectively) PA E P x R, a many-to-many permission-to-role assignment relation UA c U x R, a many-to-many user-to-role assignment Permission sets are used to define membership functions for locales to facilitate the definition of unique, collaboration-oriented constraints, such as the principle of greatest aurhoriry and the principle of all privileged that are presented in this paper.
General Access
Based on the definition of Locale-BAC, access determinations are defined as a function that maps a session and permission to a Boolean as follows: * access: (S x P) + {true, false), a function mapping a session si and permission pi to a Boolean, access(si,
safe(locale( si)))
Narrative: A user may invoke a permission in a locale if the permission is a member of the permission set for the user's session in the locale and there are no constraint violations.
Locale Participation
Before an invocation request $an he satisfied, a user must participate in a locale. The role assignment (RA) relation defines those locales within which a user may participate. This can be defined as:
-For a given user U, and locale I,, participare(u,, 1,) = 
locale(s))l
Narrative: A user is participating in a locale if and only if that there exists a session for the given user and locale.
Authorization Constraints
An important implication of applying the Locale Framework to collaborative access control is that authorization decisions always occur in context. Our observations show that several authorization decisions depend heavily on context. For example, consider a scenario where in order for a user to invoke a permission in a collaborative setting, it is required that all individuals, active in that context be equally privileged. -e.g., a Faculty Member may he able to read/view student grade sheets only when all individuals in the current context have the same privilege. In other collaborative contexts, the invocation of certain permissions may depend on the presence or absence or specific individuals, resources, etc.
-e.g., an Assistant Project Manager may be authorized to enact design changes in absence of the Project Manager.
Authorization decisions similar to those presented above are often required for collaborative access control. We believe the natural way to express these requirements is as constraints within Locale-BAC. In the following, we highlight three such constraints: i) single user session per locale; ii) the principle of all privileged; and iii) the principle of greatest authority.
5.1
Single User Session per Locale
For some collaboration environments it might be useful to enforce a constraint restricting users to assume only a single identity (i.e., session) per context. This feature can be easily expressed by allowing only a single user session per locale. Narrative: For any given locale, a user will have at most one session.
5.2
Principle of AI1 Privileged Defining membership levels for permissions in the capability list for a locale allows natural expression of constraints required by most collaboration environments. One such constraint is the principle of all privileged which requires the existence of a set of permissions, Narrative: For a session to invoke a permission in a locale, where the permission is a member of the "all privileged" set for the locale, all sessions active in the locale at the time of invocation must have the permission in their permission set.
5.3
Principle of Greatest Authority
In many collaborative settings the ability to invoke a particular permission may be deferred to the user(s) with the greatest authority as specified by the role hierarchy (RH) relation. This newly identified constraint requires the existence of a set of permissions, grearesr-authority(li) c capability(li), for each locale li such that:
Narrative: For a user to invoke a permission in a locale, where the permission is a member of the "greatest authority" set for the locale, the user must be active in a role in the locale that both is related directly or indirectly (via the role dominance relation) to the permission and for which there is no other user in an active role of greater authority (i.e., strict dominance) in the locale.
The usefulness of these constraints is demonstrated using example scenarios in the next section.
Example Scenarios
In this section, we present five example scenarios to demonstrate the effectiveness of the Locale-BAC Model. To aid in this demonstration, we have constructed an example Locale-BAC policy for a hypothetical academic institution. For each scenario, assume the role hierarchy as shown in Figure 3 . The user to role assignment (UA) and locale to role assignment (RA) for these scenarios are expressed in Table 1 and Table 2 . This action is prohibited according to definition of the role assignment relation (RA), which specifies the roles that can be active for a session in the context a given locale. This scenario demonstrates the impact of the roleto-locale assignment (RA) relation on the Registrar's Ofice Locale by the manner in which it narrows down the list of potential sessions that can be created in its context. In this scenario, B through SE will be granted the permissions assigned to the role of a Dean, Lab Supervisor, Faculty, and Student; whereas C and D, through Sc and SD, respectively, are only granted the permissions assigned to the role of a Faculty and Srudent. This scenario is used to demonstrate that the permissions a user is able to invoke in the context of a locale depend on the role the user activates in the session to enter the locale and the roles assigned to the locale. For this scenario, assume users C, 0, E, and F wish to invoke permissions on the locale object entitled Student-Evaluation.xls. Since the permissions on this object are members of the allgrivileged set, when these users are present in the locale as assumed, the only permissions that may be invoked on the object are the Read and Lookup permissions. Thus, although the permission assignment relation (PA) states that users active in the Faculty role may invoke the Write permission, the allgrivileged constraint prohibits its invocation. Table 5 In this scenario, only user A can exercise a Write permission for Srudent-Dissertation_Evaluation.doc as this permission is a member of the greatest-authoriry set for the Registrar's Office Locale. This is the case even though sessions SE, Sc and S, have same the permission through the user and permission assignment relations. The access table for the various combinations of roles present in the Registrar's Ofice Locale is shown in Table 6 . 
Locale Policies
The above constraints and example scenarios highlight that permission invocation is not always a discrete event. Some operations, such as read, are continuous and, thus, must be continuously reassessed with changes to the invocation context, i.e., the locale. When and how changes are allowed to a locale is thus a very important issue.
Consider the situation where an allgrivileged permission, such as read, is being appropriately invoked within a particular locale. What should happen when an additional user attempts to enter the locale, but for whom the session s h e can or wishes to create does not contain the alljrivileged permission in its permission set? We envision several possible solutions to this situation.
-The system could deny the user access to the locale.
The system could terminate the invocation of the allgrivileged permission and then allow the user access to the locale.
The system could prompt users present in the locale, informing them of the situation and inquiring whether they wish to deny entry or to terminate the permission invocation and allow entry.
These and many other protocols could be enacted when changes to locales are requested or simply occur. We believe that the manner in which locales respond to such situations are context dependent and therefore must be configurable. Thus, we propose the use of an extensible set of locale policies to account for these situations. 
Conclusions and Future Work
A fundamental goal of any collaborative system is to cater effectively to the collaboration needs of users while maintaining the required security and privacy for users and resources. Realizing this goal is essential to the success of such systems.
We believe that placing authorization decisions in context is not achieved easily by building complex policies within existing authorization models. Rather, we contend that baselme changes to existing models are necessary to meet the unique requirements of collaborative system. In this paper, we presented the Locale-Based Access Control (Locale-BAC) model as a baseline derivation to the traditional RBAC model and demonstrated the usefulness and appropriateness of this model through several newly identified authorization constraints and supporting scenarios.
While Locale-BAC is an important fxst step in the effort to incorporate context more fully into authorization decisions, much work remains to be done. Future work includes: designing a standard Locale-BAC constraint specification language, incorporating administrative functions, identifying additional collaboration-specific constraints, and broadening the scope of Locale-BAC to support process, time, and individual views effectively. In addition, our current efforts are focused on developing a proof-of-concept implementation of the Locale-BAC model using type definition languages such 3s XML Schema. Such an implementation will validate the model and assist collaborative system designers in their effort to incorporate Locale-BAC into existing collaborative infrastructures.
